

**Example 23. (bonus challenge!)** Eve, can you crack the following message?

*KOBOSNOXSGYOM*

Word on the street is that Alice was using the Vigenere cipher with a key of size 2.

(To collect a bonus point, send me an email before next week with the plaintext and how you found it.)

**Example 24.** The challenge from Example 22 was encrypted using a shift cipher. The key space has size 26, so a brute-force attack results in immediate success: we find that the plaintext is ... This is the worst kind of vulnerability: we successfully mounted a **ciphertext only attack**.

That is, just knowing the encrypted message, we were able to decrypt it (and discover the key that was used).

**Attacks**

So far, we considered the weakest kind of attack only: namely, a **ciphertext only attack**. And, even then, the historical ciphers prove to be terribly insecure.

However, we need to also worry about attacks where our enemy has additional insight.

- In a **known plaintext attack**, the enemy somehow has knowledge of a plaintext-ciphertext pair  $(m, c)$ .
- In a **chosen plaintext attack**, the enemy can, herself, compute  $c = E(m)$  for a chosen plaintext  $m$  ("gained some sort of access to our encryption device").
- In a **chosen ciphertext attack**, the enemy can, herself, compute  $m = D(c)$  for a chosen ciphertext  $c$  ("gained some sort of access to our decryption device").

There exist many variations of these. Sometimes, the attacker can make several choices (maybe even adaptively), sometimes she only has partial information.

**Example 25.** Alice sends the ciphertext *BKNDKGBQ* to Bob. Somehow, Eve has learned that Alice is using the Vigenere cipher and that the plaintext is *ALLCLEAR*. Next day, Alice sends the message *DNFFQGE*. Crack it and figure out the key that Alice used! (What kind of attack is this?)

**Solution.** This is a known plaintext attack.

Since  $m + k = c$  (to be interpreted characterwise, modulo 26, and with  $k$  repeated as necessary), we can find  $k$  simply as  $k = c - m$ .

For instance, since  $A$  (value 0!) got encrypted to  $B$ , the first letter of the key is  $B$ .

<i>c</i>		<i>B</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>N</i>	<i>D</i>	<i>K</i>	<i>G</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Q</i>
<i>m</i>	-	<i>A</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>L</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>A</i>	<i>R</i>
<i>k</i>	=	<i>B</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Z</i>	<i>C</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>Z</i>

We conclude that the key is  $k = BZC$ . Now, we can decrypt any future message that Alice sends using this key. For instance, we easily decrypt *DNFFQGE* to *CODERED* (using  $m = c - k$ ).

All of the historical ciphers we have seen, including the substitution cipher below, fall apart completely under a known plaintext attack.

**Example 26. (substitution cipher)** In a substitution cipher, the key  $k$  is some permutation of the letters  $A, B, \dots, Z$ . For instance,  $k = FRA\dots$ . Then we encrypt  $A \rightarrow F, B \rightarrow R, C \rightarrow A$  and so on. How large is the key space?

**Solution.** Key space has size  $26! \approx 10^{26.6} \approx 2^{88.4}$ , so a key can be stored using 89 bits. That's actually a fairly large key space (for instance, DES has a key size of 56 bits only). Too large to go through by brute force.

**However, still easy to break.** Since each letter is always replaced with the same letter, this cipher is susceptible to a **frequency attack**, exploiting that certain letters (and, more generally, letter combinations!) occur much more frequently in, say, English text than others. For instance, Lewand's book on Cryptology lists the following frequencies:

E: 12.7%, T: 9.1%, A: 8.2%, O: 7.5%, I: 7%, N: 6.7%, S: 6.3%, H: 6.1%, R: 6%, D: 4.3%, L: 4%, C: 2.8%, ...

The rarest letters are Q and Z with a frequency of about 0.1% only. (The exact frequencies and precise ordering varies between different sources and the body of text that the frequencies were obtained from.)

The most common letter pairs (digrams) are TH HE AN RE ER IN ON AT ND ST ES EN OF TE ED OR TI HI AS TO.

More information at: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter\\_frequency](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Letter_frequency)

**Comment.** Note that the frequencies and even the ranking depend considerably on the source of text. For instance, using government telegrams, a military resource lists EN followed by RE, ER as the most frequent digrams. That same manual suggests SENORITA as a mnemonic to remember the most frequent letters.

<http://www.umich.edu/~umich/fm-34-40-2/> (Field Manual 34-40-2, Department of the Army, 1990)

**Example 27.** It seems convenient to add the space as a 27th letter in the historic encryption schemes. Can you think of a reason against doing that?

**Solution.** In most texts, the space occurs more frequently and more regularly than any other letter. Adding it to the encryption schemes would make them even more susceptible to attacks.

### Fermat's little theorem

**Example 28. (warmup)** What a terrible blunder... Explain what is wrong!

$$\text{(incorrect!)} \quad 10^9 \equiv 3^2 = 9 \equiv 2 \pmod{7}$$

**Solution.**  $10^9 = 10 \cdot 10 \cdot \dots \cdot 10 \equiv 3 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots \cdot 3 = 3^9$ . Hence,  $10^9 \equiv 3^9 \pmod{7}$ .

However, there is no reason, why we should be allowed to reduce the exponent by 7 (and it is incorrect).

**Corrected calculation.**  $3^2 \equiv 2$ ,  $3^4 \equiv 4$ ,  $3^8 \equiv 16 \equiv 2$ . Hence,  $3^9 = 3^8 \cdot 3^1 \equiv 2 \cdot 3 \equiv -1 \pmod{7}$ .

By the way, this approach of computing powers via exponents that are 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, ... is called **binary exponentiation**. It is crucial for efficiently computing large powers.

**Corrected calculation (using Fermat).**  $3^6 \equiv 1$  just like  $3^0 = 1$ . Hence, we are allowed to reduce exponents modulo 6. Hence,  $3^9 \equiv 3^3 \equiv -1 \pmod{7}$ .

**Theorem 29. (Fermat's little theorem)** Let  $p$  be a prime, and suppose that  $p \nmid a$ . Then

$$a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}.$$

**Proof. (beautiful!)** Since  $a$  is invertible modulo  $p$ , the first  $p-1$  multiples of  $a$ ,

$$a, 2a, 3a, \dots, (p-1)a$$

are all different modulo  $p$ . Clearly, none of them is divisible by  $p$ .

Consequently, these values must be congruent (in some order) to the values  $1, 2, \dots, p-1$  modulo  $p$ . Thus,

$$a \cdot 2a \cdot 3a \cdot \dots \cdot (p-1)a \equiv 1 \cdot 2 \cdot 3 \cdot \dots \cdot (p-1) \pmod{p}.$$

Cancelling the common factors (allowed because  $p$  is prime!), we get  $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ . □

**Remark.** The "little" in this theorem's name is to distinguish this result from Fermat's last theorem that  $x^n + y^n = z^n$  has no integer solutions if  $n > 2$  (only recently proved by Wiles).

**Example 30. (bonus challenge!)** You intercept the following message from Alice:

WHCUHFWXOWHUQXOMOMQVSQWAMWHCUHFXOLNWXQMVSQWAWMQLN

Your experience tells you that Alice is using a substitution cipher. You also know that this message contains the word “secret”. Can you crack it?

**Note.** In modern practice, it is not uncommon to know (or suspect) what a certain part of the message should be. For instance, PDF files start with “%PDF” (0x25504446).

See [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic\\_number\\_\(programming\)](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Magic_number_(programming)) for more such instances.

(To collect a bonus point, send me an email before next week with the plaintext and how you found it.)

**Example 31.** Compute  $3^{1003} \pmod{101}$ .

**Solution.** Since 101 is a prime,  $3^{100} \equiv 1 \pmod{101}$  by Fermat’s little theorem.

Because  $3^{100} \equiv 3^0 \pmod{101}$ , this enables us to reduce exponents modulo 100.

In particular, since  $1003 \equiv 3 \pmod{100}$ , we have  $3^{1003} \equiv 3^3 = 27 \pmod{101}$ .

**Euler’s theorem**

Recall that Fermat’s little theorem is just the special case of Euler’s theorem :

**Theorem 32. (Euler’s theorem)** If  $n \geq 1$  and  $\gcd(a, n) = 1$ , then  $a^{\phi(n)} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ .

**Proof.** Euler’s theorem can be proved along the lines of our earlier proof of Fermat’s little theorem. The only adjustment is to only start with multiples  $ka$  where  $k$  is invertible modulo  $n$ . There are  $\phi(n)$  such residues  $k$ , and so that’s where Euler’s phi function comes in. Can you complete the proof? □

**Example 33.** What are the last two (decimal) digits of  $3^{7082}$ ?

**Solution.** We need to determine  $3^{7082} \pmod{100}$ .  $\phi(100) = \phi(2^2 5^2) = \phi(2^2)\phi(5^2) = (2^2 - 2^1)(5^2 - 5^1) = 40$ .

Since  $\gcd(3, 100) = 1$  and  $7082 \equiv 2 \pmod{40}$ , Euler’s theorem shows that  $3^{7082} \equiv 3^2 = 9 \pmod{100}$ .

**Binary exponentiation**

**Example 34.** Compute  $3^{25} \pmod{101}$ .

**Solution.** Fermat’s little theorem is not helpful here.

Instead, we do **binary exponentiation**:

$$3^2 = 9, 3^4 = 81 \equiv -20, 3^8 \equiv (-20)^2 = 400 \equiv -4, 3^{16} \equiv (-4)^2 \equiv 16, \text{ all modulo } 101$$

$25 = 16 + 8 + 1$  [Every integer  $n \geq 0$  can be written as a sum of distinct powers of 2 (in a unique way).]

$$\text{Hence, } 3^{25} = 3^{16} \cdot 3^8 \cdot 3^1 \equiv 16 \cdot (-4) \cdot 3 = -192 \equiv 10 \pmod{101}.$$

**Example 35. (extra practice)** Compute  $2^{20} \pmod{41}$ .

**Solution.**  $2^2 = 4, 2^4 = 16, 2^8 = 256 \equiv 10, 2^{16} \equiv 100 \equiv 18$ . Hence,  $2^{20} = 2^{16} \cdot 2^4 \equiv 18 \cdot 16 = 288 \equiv 1 \pmod{41}$ .

Or:  $2^5 = 32 \equiv -9 \pmod{41}$ . Hence,  $2^{20} = (2^5)^4 \equiv (-9)^4 = 81^2 \equiv (-1)^2 = 1 \pmod{41}$ .

**Comment.** Write  $a = 2^{20} \pmod{41}$ . It follows from Fermat’s little theorem that  $a^2 = 2^{40} \equiv 1 \pmod{41}$ . The argument below shows that  $a \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{41}$  [but we don’t know which until we do the calculation].

The equation  $x^2 \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$  is equivalent to  $(x - 1)(x + 1) \equiv 0 \pmod{p}$  [b/c  $(x - 1)(x + 1) = x^2 - 1$ ]. Since  $p$  is a prime and  $p \mid (x - 1)(x + 1)$ , we must have  $p \mid (x - 1)$  or  $p \mid (x + 1)$ . In other words,  $x \equiv \pm 1 \pmod{p}$ .

## Representations of integers in different bases

We are commonly using the **decimal system** of writing numbers:

$$1234 = 4 \cdot 10^0 + 3 \cdot 10^1 + 2 \cdot 10^2 + 1 \cdot 10^3.$$

10 is called the base, and 1, 2, 3, 4 are the digits in base 10. To emphasize that we are using base 10, we will write  $1234 = (1234)_{10}$ . Likewise, we write

$$(1234)_b = 4 \cdot b^0 + 3 \cdot b^1 + 2 \cdot b^2 + 1 \cdot b^3.$$

In this example,  $b > 4$ , because, if  $b$  is the base, then the digits have to be in  $\{0, 1, \dots, b-1\}$ .

**Example 36.**  $25 = \boxed{1} \cdot 2^4 + \boxed{1} \cdot 2^3 + \boxed{0} \cdot 2^2 + \boxed{0} \cdot 2^1 + \boxed{1} \cdot 2^0$ . We write  $25 = (11001)_2$ .

**Example 37.** Express 49 in base 2.

**Solution.**

- $49 = 24 \cdot 2 + \boxed{1}$ . Hence,  $49 = (\dots 1)_2$  where ... are the digits for 24.
- $24 = 12 \cdot 2 + \boxed{0}$ . Hence,  $49 = (\dots 01)_2$  where ... are the digits for 12.
- $12 = 6 \cdot 2 + \boxed{0}$ . Hence,  $49 = (\dots 001)_2$  where ... are the digits for 6.
- $6 = 3 \cdot 2 + \boxed{0}$ . Hence,  $49 = (\dots 0001)_2$  where ... are the digits for 3.
- $3 = 1 \cdot 2 + \boxed{1}$ , with  $\boxed{1}$  left over. Hence,  $49 = (110001)_2$ .

**Other bases.**

What is 49 in base 3?  $49 = 16 \cdot 3 + \boxed{1}$ ,  $16 = 5 \cdot 3 + \boxed{1}$ ,  $5 = 1 \cdot 3 + \boxed{2}$ ,  $\boxed{1}$ . Hence,  $49 = (1211)_3$ .

What is 49 in base 5?  $49 = (144)_5$ .

What is 49 in base 7?  $49 = (100)_7$ .

**Example 38.** Bases 2, 8 and 16 (binary, octal and hexadecimal) are commonly used in computer applications.

For instance, in JavaScript or Python, `0b...` means  $(\dots)_2$ , `0o...` means  $(\dots)_8$ , and `0x...` means  $(\dots)_{16}$ .

The digits 0, 1, ..., 15 in hexadecimal are typically written as 0, 1, ..., 9, A, B, C, D, E, F.

**Example.** FACE value in decimal?  $(FACE)_{16} = 15 \cdot 16^3 + 10 \cdot 16^2 + 12 \cdot 16 + 14 = 64206$

**Practical example.** `chmod 664 file.tex` (change file permission)

664 are octal digits, consisting of three bits:  $1 = (001)_2$  execute (x),  $2 = (010)_2$  write (w),  $4 = (100)_2$  read (r)

Hence, 664 means rw,rw,r. What is `rx,-?` 750

By the way, a fourth (leading) digit can be specified (setting the flags: `setuid`, `setgid`, and `sticky`).

**Example 39. (terrible jokes, parental guidance advised)**

*There are 10 types of people... those who understand binary, and those who don't.*

Of course, you knew that. How about:

*There are 11 types of people... those who understand Roman numerals, and those who don't.*

It's not getting any better:

*There are 10 types of people... those who understand hexadecimal, F the rest...*

**Example 40. (yet another joke)** Why do mathematicians confuse Halloween and Christmas?

Because  $31 \text{ Oct} = 25 \text{ Dec}$ .

**Get it?**  $(31)_8 = 1 + 3 \cdot 8 = 25$  equals  $(25)_{10} = 25$ .

Fun borrowed from: [https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical\\_joke](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mathematical_joke)

## Modern ciphers

**Example 41.** For modern ciphers, we will change the alphabet from  $A, B, \dots, Z$  to  $0, 1$ . One of the most common ways of encoding text is **ASCII**.

In ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange), each letter is represented using 8 bits (1 byte).

Among the  $2^8 = 256$  many characters are the usual letters, as well as common symbols.

For instance:  $\text{space} = (20)_{16}$ ,  $\text{"0"} = (30)_{16}$ ,  $A = (41)_{16} = (0100, 0001)_2 = 65$ ,  $a = (61)_{16} = (0110, 0001)_2 = 97$

See, for instance, <http://www.asciitable.com> for the full table.

**Example 42.** The new (8/2018) insignia of **FinCEN** features binary digits. What do they mean?

01000110 01101001 01101110 01000011 01000101 01001110 <https://www.fincen.gov>

**By the way.** If you ever have more than \$10,000 in foreign accounts, you must file a report to FinCEN.

## One-time pad

**Definition 43.** The “exclusive or” (XOR), often written  $\oplus$ , is defined bitwise:

	0	0	1	1
$\oplus$	0	1	0	1
$=$	0	1	1	0

**Note.** On the level of individual bits, this is just addition modulo 2.

**By the way.** Best thing about a boolean: even if you are wrong, you are only off by a bit.

**Example 44.**  $1011 \oplus 1111 = 0100$

**Example 45.** Observe that  $a \oplus b \oplus b = a$ .

One way to see that is think bitwise in terms of addition modulo 2. Then,  $a + b + b = a + 2b \equiv a \pmod{2}$ .

A **one-time pad** works as follows. We use a key  $k$  of the same length as the message  $m$ . Then the ciphertext is

$$c = E_k(m) = m \oplus k.$$

To decipher, we use  $m = D_k(c) = c \oplus k$ .

As the name indicates, we must never use this key again!

**Note.** Observe that encryption and decryption are the same routine.

**Comment.** If that is helpful, a one-time pad is doing exactly the same as the Vigenere cipher if we use a key of the same length as the message (also, we use  $0, 1$  as our letters instead of the classical  $A, B, \dots, Z$ ).

**Example 46.** Using a one-time pad with key  $k = 1100, 0011$ , what is the message  $m = 1010, 1010$  encrypted to?

**Solution.**  $c = m \oplus k = 0110, 1001$

If a one-time pad (with perfectly random key) is used exactly once to encrypt a message, then **perfect confidentiality** is achieved (eavesdropping is hopeless).

Meaning that Eve intercepting the ciphertext can draw absolutely no conclusions about the plaintext (because, without information on the key, every text of the right length is actually possible and equally likely), see next example.

**Example 47.** A ciphertext only attack on the one-time pad is entirely hopeless. Explain why!

**Solution.** The attacker only knows  $c = m \oplus k$ . The attacker is unable to get any information on  $m$ , because every other message  $m'$  (of the right length) could have resulted in the same ciphertext  $c$ . Indeed, the key  $k' = m' \oplus c$  encrypts  $m'$  to  $c$  as well (because  $m' \oplus k' = m' \oplus (m' \oplus c) = c$ ). Moreover, every plaintext  $m'$  is equally likely because it corresponds to a unique key.

The next example highlights the importance of only using the key once.

**Example 48. (attack on the two-time pad)** Alice made a mistake and encrypted the two plaintexts  $m_1, m_2$  using the same key  $k$ . How can Eve exploit that?

**Solution.** Eve knows the two ciphertexts  $c_1 = m_1 \oplus k$  and  $c_2 = m_2 \oplus k$ .

Hence, she can compute  $c_1 \oplus c_2 = (m_1 \oplus k) \oplus (m_2 \oplus k) = m_1 \oplus m_2$ .

This means that Eve knows  $m_1 \oplus m_2$ , which is information about the original plaintexts (no key involved!). That's a cryptographic disaster: Eve should never be able to learn *anything* about the plaintexts.

**In fact.** If the plaintexts are, say, English text encoded using ASCII then Eve very possibly can (almost) reconstruct both  $m_1$  and  $m_2$  from  $m_1 \oplus m_2$ . The reason for that is that the messages are expressed in ASCII, which means 8 bits per character of text. However, the **entropy** (a measure for the amount of information in a message) of (longer) typical English text is frequently below 2 bits per character.

Some details and beautiful graphical illustration are given at:

<http://crypto.stackexchange.com/questions/59/taking-advantage-of-one-time-pad-key-reuse>

We saw in Example 47 that ciphertext only attacks on the one-time pad are entirely hopeless. What about other attacks?

Attacks like known plaintext or chosen plaintext don't apply if the key is only to be used once.

Yet, the one-time pad by itself provides **little protection of integrity**. The next example shows how tampering is possible without knowledge about the key.

**Example 49.** Alice sends an email to Bob using a one-time pad. Eve knows that and concludes that, per email standard, the plaintext must begin with To: Bob. Eve wants to tamper with the message and change it to To: Boo, for a light scare.

- Eve wants to change the 7th letter of the plain text  $m$  from  $b$  to  $o$ .
- Since  $b$  is  $0x62$  and  $o$  is  $0x6F$ , we have  $b \oplus o = 0x0D$ . Hence,  $b \oplus 0x0D = o$ .
- Therefore, if  $e = 0x\underbrace{000000000000D00\dots}_{6 \text{ characters}}$ , then  $\underbrace{\text{“TO: Bob...”}}_m \oplus e = \underbrace{\text{“TO: Boo...”}}_{m'}$ .
- Alice sends  $c = m \oplus k$ . If Eve changes the ciphertext  $c$  to  $c' = c \oplus e$ , then Bob receives  $c'$  and decrypts it to  $c' \oplus k = \underbrace{m \oplus k}_{=c} \oplus e \oplus k = m \oplus e = m'$ , which is what Eve intended.

Using the one-time pad presents several challenges, including:

- keys must not be reused (see Example 48)
- while perfectly protecting against eavesdropping (if done correctly), the one-time pad is not secure against tampering (see Example 49)
- key distribution and management
  - Alice and Bob have to somehow exchange huge amounts of keys, so that, at a later time, they are able to communicate securely.
- for perfect confidentiality, the key must be perfectly random
  - But how can we produce huge amounts of random bits?
  - Especially, how to teach a deterministic machine like a computer to do that? Think about it! This is much more challenging than it may seem at first...

These issues make one-time pads difficult to use in practice.

**Historic comment.** During the Cold War, the “hot line” between Washington and Moscow apparently used one-time pads for secure communication.