

Review.

- A **pseudorandom generator** (PRG) takes a seed x_0 and produces a stream $\text{PRG}(x_0) = x_1 x_2 x_3 \dots$ of numbers, which should be close to random numbers.
For cryptographic purposes, these numbers should be indistinguishable from random numbers. Even for somebody who knows everything about the PRG except the seed. (See Example 53.)
- Once we have a PRG, we can use it as a **stream cipher**: Using the key k , we encrypt $E_k(m) = m \oplus \text{PRG}(k)$. [Here, the key stream $\text{PRG}(k)$ is assumed to be in bits.]
As with the one-time pad, we must never reuse the same keystream!
- To reuse the key, we can use a **nonce**: $E_k(m) = m \oplus \text{PRG}(\text{nonce}, k)$, where the seed is produced by combining the **nonce** and k (for instance, just concatenating them).
The nonce is then passed (unencrypted) along with the message.
To never reuse the same keystream, we must never use the same nonce with the same key.

How to generate random numbers?

Natural randomness is surprisingly difficult to harness.

You can for instance play around with a Geiger counter but our department is short on these and getting lots of random numbers is again challenging.

Linear congruential generators

(linear congruential generator) Let a, b, m be chosen parameters.

From the seed x_0 , we produce the sequence $x_{n+1} = ax_n + b \pmod{m}$.

The choice of a, b, m is crucial for this to generate acceptable pseudorandom numbers.

For instance, glibc uses $a = 1103515245$, $b = 12345$, $m = 2^{31}$. (This is one of two implementations.) In that case, each x_i is represented by precisely 31 bits. [Note that the choice of m makes this very fast.]

Linear congruential generators (LCG) are easy to predict and must not be used for cryptographic purposes. More generally, all polynomial generators are cryptographically insecure. They are still used in practice, because they are fast and easy to implement and have decent statistical properties. (For instance, your online homework is generated using random numbers, and there is no need for crypto-level security there.)

Statistical trouble. Can you see why the sequences produced by the glibc LCG alternate between even and odd numbers? (Similarly, other low bits are much less "random" than the higher bits.) Because of this defect, some programs (and other implementations of `rand()` based on LCGs) throw away the low bits entirely.

Example 49. Generate values using the linear congruential generator $x_{n+1} = 5x_n + 3 \pmod{8}$, starting with the seed $x_0 = 6$.

Solution. $x_1 = 1, x_2 = 0, x_3 = 3, x_4 = 2, x_5 = 5, x_6 = 4, x_7 = 7, x_8 = 6$. This is the value x_0 again, so the sequence will now repeat. Note that we went through all 8 residues before repeating. Period 8.

Note. Because $8 = 2^3$ we can represent each x_i using exactly 3 bits. Then $x_1, x_2, x_3, \dots = 1, 0, 3, \dots$ corresponds to the bit stream $(001\ 000\ 011\ \dots)_2$.

Example 50. (extra) Observe that the sequence produced by the linear congruential generator $x_{n+1} = ax_n + b \pmod{m}$ must repeat, at the latest, after m terms. (Why?!)

One can give precise conditions on a, b, m to achieve a full period m . Namely, this happens if and only if $\gcd(b, m) = 1$ and $a - 1$ is divisible by all primes (as well as 4) dividing m .

- (a) Generate values using a linear congruential generator $x_{n+1} = 2x_n + 1 \pmod{10}$, starting with the seed $x_0 = 5$. When do they repeat? Is that consistent with the mentioned condition?
- (b) What are possible values for a so that the LCG $x_{n+1} = ax_n + 11 \pmod{100}$ has period 100?
- (c) glibc uses $a = 1103515245$, $b = 12345$, $m = 2^{31}$. After how many terms will the sequence repeat?

Solution.

- (a) $x_1 = 1$, $x_2 = 3$, $x_3 = 7$, $x_4 = 5$. This is the value x_0 again, so the sequence will repeat. Period 4.
[The period is less than 10. This is as predicted by the mentioned condition, because $a - 1$ is not divisible by 2 and 5.]
- (b) We need that $a - 1$ is divisible by 4 and 5. Equivalently, $a \equiv 1 \pmod{20}$. Hence, possible values are $a = 1, 21, 41, 61, 81$.
- (c) Clearly, $\gcd(b, m) = 1$. Also, $a - 1$ is divisible by 4 (and no primes other than 2 divide m). Hence, for every seed, values repeat only after going through all 2^{31} residues.

Example 51. Let's use the PRG $x_{n+1} = 5x_n + 3 \pmod{8}$ as a stream cipher with the key $k = 4 = (100)_2$. The key is used as the seed x_0 and the keystream is $\text{PRG}(k) = x_1 x_2 \dots$ (where each x_i is 3 bits). Encrypt the message $m = (101\ 111\ 001)_2$.

Solution. We first use the PRG with seed $x_0 = k$ to produce the keystream $\text{PRG}(k) = 7, 6, 1, \dots = (111\ 110\ 001\ \dots)_2$.

We then encrypt and get $c = E_k(m) = m \oplus \text{PRG}(k) = (101\ 111\ 001)_2 \oplus (111\ 110\ 001)_2 = (010\ 001\ 000)_2$.

Decryption. Observe that decryption works in the exact same way:

$D_k(c) = c \oplus \text{PRG}(k) = (010\ 001\ 000)_2 \oplus (111\ 110\ 001)_2 = (101\ 111\ 001)_2$.

Note. The keystream continues as $\text{PRG}(k) = 7, 6, 1, 0, 3, 2, 5, 4, \dots$. At this point it repeats itself because we obtained the value 4, which was our seed. Since the state of this PRG only depends on the value of x_n , and there is 8 possible values for x_n , the period 8 is the longest possible. The homework from last class gave conditions on the PRG that guarantee that the period is as long as possible.

Example 52. Can you think of a way in which the numbers produced by a linear congruential generator differ from truly random ones?

Solution. An easy observation is the following: by construction, $x_{n+1} = ax_n + b \pmod{m}$, individual numbers don't repeat unless a full period is reached and everything repeats. Truly random numbers do repeat every now and then (however, if m is large, then this observation is not exactly practical).

Of course, knowing the parameters a, b, m , the numbers generated by the PRG are terribly **predictable**. Knowing just one number, we can produce all the next ones (as well as the ones before). A PRG that is safe for cryptographic purposes should not be predictable like that! (See next example.)

The next example illustrates the vulnerability of stream ciphers, based on predictable PRGs.

Recall that it is common to know or guess pieces of plaintexts; for instance every PDF begins with %PDF.

Example 53. Eve intercepts the ciphertext $c = (111\ 111\ 111)_2$. It is known that a stream cipher with PRG $x_{n+1} = 5x_n + 3 \pmod{8}$ was used for encryption. Eve also knows that the plaintext begins with $m = (110\ 1\dots)_2$. Help her crack the ciphertext!

Solution. Since $c = m \oplus \text{PRG}$, we learn that the initial piece of the keystream is $\text{PRG} = m \oplus c = (110\ 1\dots)_2 \oplus (111\ 1\dots)_2 = (001\ 0\dots)_2$. Since each x_n is 3 bits, we conclude that $x_1 = (001)_2 = 1$.

Because the PRG is predictable, we can now recreate the entire keystream! Using $x_{n+1} = 5x_n + 3 \pmod{8}$, we find $x_2 = 0$, $x_3 = 3$, ... In other words, $\text{PRG} = 1, 0, 3, \dots = (001\ 000\ 011\ \dots)_2$.

Hence, Eve can decrypt the ciphertext and obtain $m = c \oplus \text{PRG} = (111\ 111\ 111)_2 \oplus (001\ 000\ 011)_2 = (110\ 111\ 100)_2$.